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Abstract
The present paper aims at offering a contribution to the understanding of the interactions between
finance and inequality. We investigate the ways through which income and wealth inequality may
have influenced the development of modern financial systems in advanced economies, the US economy
first and foremost, and how modern financial systems have then fed back on income and wealth
distribution. We focus in particular on securitization and on the production of complex structured
financial products. We analyse this topic by elaborating a hybrid Agent-Based Stock-Flow-Consistent
(AB-SFC) macroeconomic model, encompassing heterogenous (i.e. households) and aggregate sectors.
Our findings suggest that the increase in economic growth, favoured by the higher levels of credit
supply coming with securitization, may determine a more unequal and financially unstable economic
system. We also find that a lower degree of tax progressiveness and wider wage inequality further
polarize income and wage distribution, and reduce economic growth.
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1 Introduction
There are two well-known stylised facts as to the evolution of most developed economies since the 1970s
on. First, most developed economies, in particular Anglo-Saxon economies such as the USA and the UK,
have experienced a significant increase in income and wealth inequality (Stiglitz, 2016a). Second, the
financial sector expanded considerably, both in absolute and relative terms - with respect to the economy
as a whole (Kumhof et al., 2015). Is there any causal link between these two facts? Does (expanding)
finance carry out any effect on income and wealth distribution and vice versa?
Albeit being rather overlooked until recently, the possible relationship between finance and inequality
is not a new topic in economics. It was first addressed by economists interested in understanding whether
financial liberalization and financial development could reduce income inequality (Levine, 2005; Clarke
et al., 2006; Beck et al., 2007). More recently, the outbreak of the financial crisis was interpreted as a hint
that a reverse causality may also hold true. Indeed, several authors see in the above-mentioned increase
in income and wealth inequality, and in its effects on households’ debt, the real roots of the 2007-2008
financial shock (Fitoussi and Stiglitz, 2009; Stockhammer, 2015; Kumhof et al., 2015).
Both strands of analyses did not reach a clear-cut finding, either at theoretical or empirical level (see
Bordo and Meissner, 2012, for a rejection of the ‘inequality-leads-to-crisis’ hypothesis). But regardless
from the achievement of any consensus, what is missing in the above-mentioned theoretical or empirical
analyses is a comprehensive overview of the likely endogenous and bidirectional relationship between
finance and inequality. More specifically, we think that a relevant shortcoming of the existing contribu-
tions is the lack of a general portray of the ways through which income and wealth inequality may have
influenced the development of modern financial systems in advanced economies, the US economy first
and foremost, and how modern financial systems have then fed back on income and wealth distribution.
The present paper aims at offering a contribution in filling this gap. We do so by presenting a simple
theoretical model about the reciprocal interaction between income and wealth distribution on the one
hand, and the development of modern financial systems on the other hand. Financial systems have indeed
changed dramatically in the last three decades. New financial institutions, new financial products and
practices have emerged changing balance of power and relevance between traditional and new financial
actors. Among these aspects of novelty, generally labelled under the name of shadow banking, we focus on
securitization practices and on the production of complex structured financial products, trying to assess
how they have interacted with income and wealth inequality. We analyse this topic by elaborating a hy-
brid Agent-Based Stock-Flow-Consistent (AB-SFC) macroeconomic model, encompassing heterogenous
(i.e. households) and aggregate sectors. Into this framework, we allow households to get access to bank
lending in order to achieve their consumption goals as well as to accumulate financial assets in the form of
shares of Investment Funds. Investment Funds, in turn, remunerate households’ financial investments by
allocating recollected funds on different financial assets, namely risk-free low-remunerative government
bonds and (relatively) riskier more-remunerative structured financial products such as Collateralised Debt
Obligations (CDOs). The production of CDOs as carried out by investment banks is ultimately meant
to satisfy the demand of remunerative assets by (wealthy) households and is permitted by the endoge-
nous securitization of (a part of) commercial banks’ original loans to households and non-financial firms.
Through the mechanisms of our model, we provide a formal description of the functioning of what Stiglitz
(2015b) previously labelled as a rent-seeking or exploitation rent economy, i.e. an economic system in
which the ultimate goal of credit creation is not the financing of productive activities whereas the remu-
neration of rent positions via the production of complex structured financial products, the securitization
of existing loans, and, eventually, the over-indebtedness of middle and lower-class households.
Our analysis of the relationship between inequality and securitization leads to three major outcomes.
First, this paper provides a formal description of a perverse (and likely unsustainable) spiral between
increasing income and wealth inequality, the spread of securitization practices, and the production of
structured financial products. On the one hand, securitization and CDOs spread in order to satisfy the
appetite for high returns from (rentier) wealthy households, which command a sizeable and increasing
part of national income and wealth. On the other hand, financial systems accommodate such a demand
for remunerative assets by allowing commercial banks to extend more loans to increasingly indebted
households, and then by introducing newly created loans in the securitization process in order to produce
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CDOs. The ensuing stream of interest payments from middle and low-class households and financial
rents to top-income households exacerbates income and wealth inequality, and makes the conditions for
the development of these new financial practices even stronger.
Second, we show how the credit boom and the economic growth that increasing inequality and new
financial practices gave rise to are two intertwined aspects of a likely unsustainable process, which even-
tually ends up in an endogenously generated financial crisis. Indeed, over-indebted middle and low class
households may ultimately default on their payments commitments. This event first causes the reduction
of the remunerativeness of CDOs and of Investment Funds’ shares. Secondly, it induces the dry-up of the
demand for structured financial products, hence the break-down of the securitizing system (Gorton and
Metrick, 2012) and the end of the credit boom that securitization itself previously allowed for. Empirical
evidence from the last financial crisis tells us that restrictions to the provision of credit (if not a credit
crunch) and the freezing of financial markets are distinguishing features of a financial crisis and, very
likely, causes of an economic downturn.1
Third, in the last two years, and in particular after Donald Trump’s presidential election in the USA,
new emphasis has been put on the so-called ‘trickle-down effect’. This is the conviction that a reduction
of the tax rate for the rich, and the reduction of the degree of progressiveness in the taxation system,
will also benefit the poor by stimulating more savings, investment and growth. We test the ‘trickle-down’
hypothesis by running an experiment in which we introduce in our economic system what is commonly
labelled as the ‘flat-tax’ rate, i.e. a unique and proportional tax rate for everybody. The results of our
experiment goes in the opposite direction with respect to what put forward by the supporters of such a
reform in the taxation system. Whilst income and wealth inequality increase, investment and average
economic growth slow down. We get precisely the same results, with even higher financial fragility, when
we alternatively assume a one-shot increase in income inequality.
In the end, we believe that the self-reinforcing although destabilising (in a Minskyan sense) process
we describe in this paper lies at the basis of the structural evolution of most developed economies since
the 1970s on. By describing this process, our work offers an innovative contribution to the recent body
of literature on the causes and consequences of the increasing levels of income and wealth inequality in
advanced financialised economies over the last three decades (e.g. Atkinson et al., 2011; Piketty, 2014;
Stiglitz, 2012, 2015a, 2016a).
2 Literature review
There is an open debate in the economic literature about the relationship between inequality and finance.
A first bunch of contributions on this topic takes somehow inspiration from the literature about finan-
cial repression. The focus here is on whether financial deregulation (i.e. the removal of controls and
restrictions to the operativeness of financial operators) and/or financial development (i.e. the quantity of
resources provided by the banking system to economic actors) may contribute to reduce income inequal-
ity. Some initial responses to this research question are on the positive (see, for instance Clarke et al.,
2006; Beck et al., 2007; Abiad et al., 2008), as Levine (2005) himself stresses by stating that ‘the results
indicate that finance exerts a disproportionately large, positive impact on the poor and hence reduces
income inequality’ (Levine, 2005, p.920). The logic behind this perspective is quite simple. Financial
liberalization, and the ensuing financial development, will allow financial operators to extent credit to
those economic agents, usually the poor, which were previously cut off from external finance due to lack
of acceptable collaterals and/or the imposition of a too restrictive (perhaps prudential) regulation of
financial activity. A wider access to external finance will in turn allow more people to accumulate human
and/or physical capital, with obvious positive consequences as to income generation and the creation of
a more equitable economic environment.
The above virtuous causality nexus running from (more) finance to (less) income inequality is not
1The fragility and weak sustainability of such a self-feeding development process is also due to the fact that the risk
associated to ‘financial primary commodities’, read subprime mortgages, may have been diluted into apparently safer
structured financial products, but an increasing body of over-indebted households is still there, so that systemic financial
risk may have even increased. Interestingly, Wojnilower (1980) defines as ‘paradox of risk’ (from Keynes’ paradox of thrift)
the dynamics for which the availability of individual risk cover leads to higher systemic risk.
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undisputed however. On the one hand, some authors have made the positive effect of financial liberaliza-
tion and financial development on income inequality conditional to the presence of good economic and
political institutions (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Claessens and Perotti, 2007). Indeed, good institutions,
which ensure sound economic competition, transparency and accountability are fundamental to ensure
that financial development does not boil down to the mere concentration and capture of increasing fi-
nancial resources by a restricted elite of well-connected actors. On the other hand, some recent empirical
contributions find a negative effect of finance on income inequality (Denk and Cournede, 2015; de Haan
and Sturm, 2017). And indeed these last findings seem consistent with the broad long-run analysis of
income distribution provided by Piketty (2014). The fact that income distribution worsened the most in
those English-speaking countries, namely the USA and the UK, which experienced a significant expansion
of the financial sectors since the 1970s, that an increasing part of the income of top earners is made up
by capital income, and, finally, that access to financial markets as intermediated by professional financial
investors (read Investment Funds) allow wealthy households to get higher-than-average returns on capital
are clear symptoms if not proofs that finance can actually play a negative effect on income inequality.
Besides the effects that financial liberalization and financial development can bring about on inequality,
there is a growing interest in investigating the inverse causality link running from inequality to finance.
The outbreak of the last worldwide financial crisis significantly stimulated the emerge of such a new strand
of literature, which actually aims at explaining the occurrence of the 2007-2008 financial shock itself as
the long-term outcome of mounting inequality. There are several different interpretations of the most
proximate causes of the 2007-2008 financial shock. Blanchard (2009) and Brunnermeir (2009) focus on
some characteristic aspects of modern financial systems (however without connection with real-economy
dynamics). They basically blame the spread of securitization, the production of opaque structured
financial products, and the intricate network these practices gave rise as the most relevant factors, which
contributed to transform financial distress in a relatively tiny segment of financial markets (the market
for subprime mortgages) in a full-blown systemic financial crisis (i.e. to transform old-fashioned runs
on bank deposits into modern runs on short-term external financial on wholesale monetary markets).
Taylor (2009), on the contrary, thinks that policy mistakes, in particular a too lax monetary policy
and excessive governmental support to mortgage lending, ignited and fed the development of a boom
in the housing market that eventually went bust. Despite these analyses capture some of the factors
that contributed to feed unsustainable macro dynamics in the run-up to the crisis, they neglect to frame
them in a broader picture that connects those factors with the recent structural evolution of advanced
economies, rising inequality first and foremost. Fitoussi and Stiglitz (2009) stress this point very clearly
when they state that ‘the crisis has structural roots’ and that these roots consist in ‘the structural changes
in income distribution’. Indeed, ‘since 1980, in most advanced countries the median wage has stagnated
and inequalities have surged in favour of higher incomes [...]. In the US the compression of low incomes
was compensated by the reduction of household savings and by mounting indebtedness that allowed
spending patterns to kept virtually unchanged [so that] growth was maintained at the price of increasing
public and private indebtedness’ (Fitoussi and Stiglitz, 2009, pp.3-4).
Rajan (2010), Lysandrou (2011), Goda and Lysandrou (2014), van Treeck (2014), Stockhammer
(2015), Kumhof et al. (2015), and Russo et al. (2016) share the same perspective. Rising inequality is
to be considered the real cause of the crisis since that it generated, directly or indirectly, the quest for a
credit-led (consumption and asset price) boom and the conditions for mounting households’ indebtedness.
Rajan (2010) stresses that such a perverse causality link from inequality to finance has been vitally
intermediated by politics and political decisions. As Rajan (2010) bluntly puts it: ‘The political response
to rising inequality [...] was to expand lending to households, especially low-income ones. The benefits
- growing consumption and more jobs - were immediate, whereas paying the inevitable bill could be
postponed into the future’ (Rajan, 2010, p. 9). Fitoussi and Saraceno (2010) propose a similar point of
view, in the sense that they bring the level of the analysis to monetary policy. In their view, monetary
authorities endogenously took an accommodating stance in order to avoid a permanent (inequality-led)
deficiency of aggregate demand, but excessive expansionary monetary policy ultimately corroborated an
unsustainable credit boom and housing bubble. The starting point of Rajan’s and Fitoussi and Saraceno’s
analyses is the increasing demand for loans coming from impoverished middle and low-class households in
order to compensate for stagnant wages and maintained high consumption levels. Lysandrou (2011), and
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Goda and Lysandrou (2014) see this story from the opposite angle. It was the concentration of wealth
in the hands of a few super rich, and the ensuing rise in the demand of remunerative financial assets,
that induced the hypertrophic expansion of the financial sector and the production of structured financial
products, of which banks’ loans given to middle and low-class households constituted the primary inputs.2
It is worth noting that Kumhof et al. (2015) integrate the above two aspects in a formal DSGE
model. In their model, households at the bottom part of the income distribution increase their demand
for external finance in order to ‘keep up with the Joneses’. At the same time, wealthy households at
the top of the distribution respond to such a demand by increasing the supply of loanable funds given
the inclusion of wealth among their preferences and into their utility function. This appreciable aspect
notwithstanding, Kumhof’s model misses to provide even a rough description of the financial mechanisms,
better to say financial developments, that allowed the matching between the increasing demand for
financial assets (supply of funds) from the better off and the higher demand for loans (demand of funds)
from the worse off. This shortcoming is not trivial. On the one hand, the proliferation of remunerative,
although allegedly safe, structured financial products (CDOs) meant to satisfy the ‘appetite for rents’ from
wealthy households could only take place with the securitization of part of the stock of loans traditionally
generated by commercial banks. On the other hand, commercial banks could easily satisfy the application
for loans from indebted households and firms, and expand the stock of primary commodities for the
production of new CDOs, only by unburdening their asset position and oﬄoading part of the existing
assets out of their balance sheets and into the whirling securitization process. On top of this, it is also
through this complex network of financial mechanisms that income and wealth have been regressively
redistributed away from middle- and low-class to rich households, and inequality worsened even further.
The development of securitization and structured financial products stands out as the response to the
structural changes emerging in advanced economies as due to rising inequality, and worked to make such
trends even more acute. Rising inequality and securitization jointly contributed to the run-up towards
the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This is why a deep understanding of the complex relationship between
inequality and finance cannot depart from taking these two aspect together. We try to elaborate such
a comprehensive overview of the endogenous dynamics of inequality and financial development through
the heterogenous-household SFC model presented in the next section.
3 A formal model of an exploitation rent economy
The increase in the wealth-income ratio is a well-known stylised fact characterising advanced economies
in the last three decades. Stiglitz (2016a) clearly explains how it is possible that a relevant increase in
the wealth-income might take place alongside a constant or even decreasing capital-income ratio. This
is due to the fact that a sizeable part of wealth is not represented by ‘produced machines’, but rather
by land or ‘other ownership claims giving rise to rents’ (Stiglitz, 2016a, p.3) . Given this fact, Stiglitz
(2016a) also shows that much of the recent growth in wealth has been detached from the dynamics of
economic output and productive capital as a result of the increase in different form of rents eventually
reflected in the value of wealth itself.
A great deal of the activities giving rise to rents take place in the financial system (Stiglitz, 2012).
There are several forms of rents. One of them is the ‘exploitation’ rent, i.e. rents accruing to economic
agents as a consequence of monopoly power and of the departure from the standard assumptions of
a perfectly competitive world. The financial sector is the paradigmatic industry that can benefit of
exploitation rents given the specific role it plays in the wider economic system. Financial operators,
for instance, generate and manage a huge amount of asymmetric information. They are at the centre
of complex and often opaque network relationships, which certainly give rise to economic dynamics
inconsistent with perfect competition.3
2Stockhammer (2015) makes a similar point when he stresses that “increasing inequality has increased the propensity
to speculate, that is, it has led to a shift to more risky financial assets. One particular aspect of these developments
is that subprime derivatives, the segment where the financial crisis broke out in 2008, were developed to cater to the
demands of hedge funds that manage the assets of the super-rich. Increasing inequality has thus played a role in the origin
of the imbalances that erupted in the crisis as well as in the demand for the very assets in which the crisis broke out.”
(Stockhammer, 2015, pp.950-651).
3It is precisely due to the complex tangle of relationships finance naturally gives rise, and of the harsh economy-wide
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More in general, financial institutions are recognised the privileged position of creating (or interme-
diating) financial resources allowing economic actors to take economic decisions. Through this activity,
financial institutions simultaneously originate others’ liabilities and their own assets. In the traditional
‘originate-and-hold’ financial system, banks themselves kept the originated assets on their own balance
sheets. In the more recent ‘originate-and-distribute’ system that emerged alongside with the development
of securitization, originated assets are eventually moved (perhaps figuratively in the form of asset-backed
securities and collateralised debt obligation) onto the balance sheet of wealthy households. It is precisely
the diffusion of this practice that allowed finance to considerably increase the total amount of liabili-
ties and assets characterising the economy.4 Accordingly, the development of securitization appear as
functional to the creation of a higher stock of liabilities for the poorer and, correspondingly, of wealth
for the richer. While fuelled by inequality (through the demand of securitized assets from those better
off and the indebtedness of those worst off), they contributed to exacerbate inequality even further by
creating financial claims to be honoured by impoverished low and middle class households to the benefits
of top-income households. In our view, this represent a significant contribution to the creation of new
sources of exploitation rent, and to speed up the dynamics of wealth beyond capital and income.
The creation of interest-bearing securities starting from partitioned credit assets, (i.e. securitisation),
is not a recent financial practice. It dates back to the 18th century when it appeared in the Dutch financial
market (Frehen et al., 2014). However, over the last thirty years it reached unprecedent levels. Modern
forms of securitization have their starting point in the 1970, when in the US, Ginnie Mae started building
and selling mortgage backed securities (MBS). Ever since the market for securities rose dramatically.5
Securitization evolved beyond being a financial practice implemented by individual financial institu-
tions, with the aim of removing risky assets from their balance sheets, and became a complex system
involving different kinds of financial institutions (Botta et al., 2015). In a nutshell, commercial banks’
credit creation is the starting point. The credit is then moved on to the balance sheet of pass-through
financial entities (Special Purpose Vehicles), where different credits are pooled together according to
their characteristics (e.g. level of risk). These credit pools are then partitioned into slices and sold to
the financial system as interest bearing asset backed securities, which are bought by brokers and dealers,
and transformed into increasingly complex financial instruments, such as collateralised Debt Obligations
(CDOs). Finally, financial intermediaries - e.g. Mutual and Investment funds - purchase this complex
structured financial products.
Gorton (2010) identifies four possible explanations for the dramatic growth of securitiazion. On the one
hand, the production of structured financial products satisfied the increasing demand for (allegedly) safe
collaterals arising from the growing repo market. On the other hand, the securitization of financial assets
allowed financial institutions to circumvent regulation on capital requirements, to minimize bankruptcy
costs, and to feed financial innovation such as the creation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV). While
we largely agree with Gorton (2010), we believe that other (more) systemic elements concurred to the
development of these financial innovations. On the supply side of the story, financial deregulation,
in particular the progressive dismantling of the Glass Steagall Act, allowed financial conglomerates to
implement autonomously all the steps of the securitization process. On the demand side of the story, the
aforementioned trends in wealth inequality may have contributed to considerably increase the demand for
remunerative but relative safe financial assets. Indeed, the concentration of wealth and the consequent
proliferation of cash rich investors stimulated the rise of non-bank financial institutions investing collected
funds from wealthy households in the market for securities. Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMF),
for instance, emerged in the 70s, and became a highly popular alternative to commercial banks by
offering more remunerative and (apparently) equally safe investment opportunities than banks’ deposits
to rentiers. In turn, new (or expanding) financial actors increasingly diverted their activities towards the
engineering and production of new financial products in order to keep up with the voracious appetite for
consequences that might emerge from the break-down of these connections, that a ‘unique’ rent position characterises
financial systems in the form of the implicit public guarantee acknowledged to ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks (see Stiglitz (2016a)).
4According to the IMF (2009), an additional recent stylised fact of advanced countries is the spectacular increase in the
outstanding amount of securities, which has been taking place since the 1980s
5Several studies suggest that this rise contributed to leading the U.S. credit market towards an unstustainable path and
might therefore be considered as one the causes of the sub-prime mortgage crisis (e.g. Segoviano et al., 2013; Purnanandam,
2011; Peicuti, 2013).
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remunerative financial investments from wealthy households.
Into this framework, credit provision by the banking system has been increasingly motivated by the
need to create ‘primary’ financial assets, i.e. mortgages and consumption loans, to be used as intermediate
inputs for the production of complex structured finance securities (e.g. MBS, ABS, CDO). The mortgage
sector represented the ideal field for the rise of these financial products. Mortgages are indeed a large,
highly demanded, and relative safe - being backed by the value of the real estate - type of loan. In practice
a perfect and abundant input in the production of securities (Caverzasi et al., 2018). The deregulation
of financial markets, coupled with the endogenous credit creation by the banking system (Stiglitz and
Greenwald, 1992, 2003; Stiglitz, 2016b; McLeay et al., 2014; Kaldor, 1970) eventually made such dynamics
disruptive.
At the best of our knowledge, only a restricted bunch of papers describe the impact of securitization
on the behaviour of the financial system as a whole, none of them connecting the development of the
securitizing system to rising inequality. Mazzocchetti et al. (2017) and Lauretta (2018) propose two
agent-based models, in which the authors try to describe the effects of securitization and the ensuing
expansion in the provision of loans to the economy on growth and the business cycle. In their model,
however, securitization is a supply-driven phenomenon (Mazzocchetti et al., 2017),6 or it amounts to
a pure parametrical exercise (Lauretta, 2018), which does not show any form of endogeneity and co-
evolution with the distribution of income and wealth.7 By doing so, these models do not capture a
fundamental reason for the development of securitization, i.e. the attempt to satisfy the demand for
remunerative assets by top-income households8. Nikolaidi (2015) elaborates a SFC model in which secu-
ritization allows commercial banks to enlarge credit provision to workers’ households, which in turns rely
upon incresing indebtedness in order to alleviate the effects of stagnating wages. In this sense, Nikolaidi
(2015) successfully captures one aspect of well-know distributive dynamics in advanced economies, i.e.
wage stagnation. Nevertheless, the lack of heterogenous households does not allow Nikolaidi (2015) to
properly measure how personal income and wealth inequality coevolved with the financialization of the
economy.9
Differently from the contributions just mentioned, this paper puts the joint dynamics of inequality and
finance at the centre of its analysis. In order to accomplish with our purpose, we elaborate a hybrid Agent
Based Stock Flow Consistent (AB-SFC) macroeconomic model, with all sectors at macro-aggregated level
but the households sector. Indeed, we assume the households sector to be populated by multitude of
heterogeneous agents. On the one hand, this parsimonious use of agent-based modelling allows us to
avoid considerable problems in the interpretation of simulation results that usually arise in fully-fledged
agent-based macro models. On the other hand, it allows us to formally enquire, through the assumption
of multiple heterogeneous households, how increasing income and wealth inequality and the development
of securitizing financial systems relate each other. In this respect, the assumption of heterogeneous
households is fundamental for two reasons. First, it allows us to effectively track changes in income and
wealth inequality between increasingly poorer (at least in relative terms) low and middle class households,
and increasingly richer top percentile households. Secondly, it is essential to formally analyse the rationale
of the securitizing banking systems, and the tendency to generate financial contagion and high systemic
risks that the development of securitization inevitably brings with it. The in-depth understanding of
the systemic risk-prone nature of such a ‘macroeconomic regime’ (rising inequality matched with the
6Mazzocchetti et al. (2017) assume commercial banks to securitize the amount of existing loans that will allow them
to downsize their balance sheet and accomplish with capital requirements according to an exogenously set ‘securitization
propensity parameter’ µ. In their model, the supply of securitized assets may nevertheless respond endogenously to changes
in the riskiness of loans given to firms, which is in turn affected by the business cycle
7Lauretta (2018) describes three different dynamics of the securitization process according to three different values of
the ‘financial innovation’ parameter governing the securitization process itself.
8Goda and Lysandrou (2014) provide anecdotal evidence of the relevance of this aspect by quoting Charles Prince’s (ex
Citigroup CEO) testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Prince said: “Securitization could be seen as a
factory line. As more and more and more of these subprime mortgages were created as raw material for the securitization
process” (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014, p. 102). In connection with Price’s statement, Goda and Lysandrou (2014) also
quote Mike Francis, executive director at Morgan Stanley saying: “We almost couldn’t produce enough to keep the appetite
of our investors happy. More people wanted bonds than we could actually produce. That was our difficult task, was trying
to produce enough” (Goda and Lysandrou, 2014, p. 314).
9In her model, Nikolaidi (2015) assumes the existence of three different categories of households: worker households-type
I, worker households-type II, and rentier households.
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development of securitizing banking) cannot be reached within a macro-aggregated analytical model, or
even within a model with two classes of households. On the contrary, agent-based models can effectively
shed light on the above-mentioned economic mechanisms. Indeed, one of the major successes of agent-
based models is the ability to detect contagion dynamics in financial networks. We precisely want to
exploit such a potential of agent-based models.
As portrayed by Tables 4 and 5, we assume a simple closed simulated economy. It consists of six sec-
tors: households, non-financial productive firms (NFF), the government, commercial banks (CB), Special
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and, ultimately, investment funds (IF). Our work aims at enquiring a possible
bi-directional and endogenous relationship between (income and wealth) inequality and financialization.
For this reason, the core of our model lies in the interaction between the households sector and the overall
financial system, commercial banks, special purpose vehicles, and investment funds alike. Consistently
with our goals, we assume the households sector to be made up of N heterogenous family units, which
differ among one another for their wealth (both their initial endowment and wealth accumulated through
time) and disposable income. More in detail, each individual household has a specific disposable income.
This firstly depends on the net wage (out of taxes) from NFFs. Secondly, it also relies upon net payments
from the financial sector. Indeed, in each period of the model, those households holding IFs’ shares will
receive financial rents. At the same time, if indebted, they will have to make interest payments to CBs
(and indirectly to SPVs and IFs via the securitization chain) on their own outstanding debt stock. The
ensuing positive or negative net financial payments will contribute to increase or, alternatively, squeeze
each single household’s disposable income.
In each period, households define the desired consumption level according to their disposable income
and a ‘socially determined’ term. On top of this, households can keep their savings either in the form of
deposits, which pay no interests and are held for precautionary purposes only (e.g. to finance future con-
sumption expenditures), or as IFs’ shares. In the attempt of meeting their desired levels of consumption
and portfolio choices, households can ask for a loan to commercial banks. Considerations on borrower’s
creditworthiness guide both the banking sector’s decision on wether to grant the required loans to the
household, and the determination of the household specific interest rate.
Commercial Banks (CB) endogenously create money by extending loans to households and non-
financial firms. The degree by which CBs create new loans depends on the assessment of borrowers’
creditworthiness, as well as on prudential evaluations about their leverage (or capital requirements). In
order to circumvent possible regulatory-imposed restrictions to further expansion of their business, CBs
rely on securitization. In each period of our model, an endogenous share ‘z’ of the total loan stock is
securitized and moved onto SPVs’ balance sheet. We represent also SPVs as a macro-aggregated sector,
which performs the transformation of loans into securities. Such complex financial practice consists in
collecting a share ‘z’ of CBs-created loans to be used as ‘primary commodities’ for the production of
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), which are ultimately sold to IFs. IFs are financial intermediaries
that collect funds by issuing shares sold to households. Collected funds are invested in financial markets
by purchasing public bonds and CDOs. Whilst IFs buy government bonds as risk-free assets, CDOs
produced by SPVs are meant to satisfy (rentier) households’ appetite for higher but still relatively safe
returns. On top of heterogenous households, the real side of the economy is completed by a macro-
aggregated non-financial productive sector and by the government. Non-financial firms (NFFs) produce
a homogeneous good, sold to households for consumption, to the government for public purchases, or to
the firm sector itself for investment purposes. NFFs implement invest projects according to the degree
of capacity utilization (i.e. the intensity with which they utilize the available capital stock), as well as
their profitability. The implementation of investment projects is financed by NFFs’ net profits and loans
from CBs. Being an aggregated sector credit rationing for NFFs can only be partial. Also NFFs hold
deposits as a precautionary stance against unforeseen events (i.e. unexpected increases in the wage bill).
Finally, in a very simple way, the government collects taxes from households and firms, and makes public
expenditures. Any difference between public expenditures and tax revenues is covered by issuing bonds,
which are bought either by CBs or by IFs. The determination of bonds rate depend on the market
interaction between the supply of bonds and the corresponding demand from Ifs and CBs.
In order to capture the importance of conglomerated financial holdings in the US financial market,
we assume that IFs - which can be thought as representing non-bank financial institutions and different
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kinds of mutual funds - own the banking sector. Accordingly, CBs’ profits are entirely passed, in the
form of dividends, to IFs. Dividends from CBs, interests on CDOs and interests on government bonds
constitute IFs’ revenues. As it is standard in AB-SFC literature, our model is dynamic. Simulations last
for T periods. The sequence of events in each period is as follows:
1. Households receive their wages from NFFs and pay their wage tax.
2. Financial flows take place. Interests on public bonds are paid by the government. At the same time,
commercial banks collect interests on issued loans and keep the portion coming form non securitized
loans. CBs finally transfer their profits to the IF sector in the form of dividends.
3. The part of financial proceeds deriving from securitized loans is passed to IFs via SPVs.
4. IFs compute their revenues given by the interests paid on securitized loans (as ‘packed’ into CDOs)
and interests on public bonds holding. Revenues from invested funds are then subdivided among
shareholders in the form of remuneration of IFs’ shares.
5. Households compute their disposable income out of wages, tax payments and net financial pay-
ments and define their desired levels of consumption, deposits and stock of shares. Households go
to commercial banks and ask for loans in order to cover any possible gap between their portfolio
and consumption decisions and own available liquid resources, i.e. disposable income and stock of
deposits.
6. Commercial banks decide whether to grant loans or not to households.
7. Households adjust consumptions and portfolio decisions according to credit availability. When loans
are granted households meet their desired levels of consumptions and financial investments.
8. The government makes public expenditures. NFFs decide investments according to previous period
capacity utilization and profitability.
9. Firms produce and sell goods in order to satisfy aggregate demand. Whenever net profits - i.e.
without taxes and interests on outstanding debt - do not cover the cost of investment, firms borrow
money form the banking sector. If, on the contrary, net profits exceed the cost of investments, the
remaining is stored in the form of extra deposits.
10. The government issues public bonds in order to cover any public deficit. This safe assets are sold
on financial markets and bought by IFs and CBs.
11. Financial transactions are completed with the purchases of CDOs by IFs. IFs decide the amount
of funds collected from (rentier) households to allocate on CDO according to the spread between
interest rates on public bonds and effective returns on CDOs.
4 Behavioral equations
4.1 Households
We start the description of the equations composing our model from the households sector. In particular,
let’s see how the disposable income of each individual household’s is determined. This is formally stated
in Equations (1)-(2) below:
ydi,t = wi,t − taxwi,t + rshi,t − ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1 (1)
taxwi,t = τ
w
j wi,t
{
if wi,t < wˆt =⇒ taxw = τw1 ∗ wi,t
if wi,t ≥ wˆt =⇒ taxw = τw1 ∗ wˆ + τw2 ∗ (wi,t − wˆt)
(2)
The individual family unit and the time of the simulation are identified respectively by the subscript
i and t. In Equation (1), ydi,t stands for disposable income. The first component we take into account
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in Equation (1) is the gross wage wi,t each individual household receives from NFFs at the beginning of
each period. We first assume that the total wage bill Wt is set exogenously as a given proportion λ of the
capital stock.10 The household-specific gross wage wi,t is then determined through a stochastic process
that distributes the total wage bill over heterogeneous households according to a log-normal distribution.
With log-mean equal to 1 and log-standard deviation equal to θ. More in details, at the beginning of each
period, households’ wages are ranked in a descending order so as to maintain a certain stability in the
distribution of gross wages. This said, stochastic shocks can, to some extent, modify such a distribution
or the magnitude of the difference between wages among households. The inclusion of stochastic shocks
in the process of wage generation is meant to capture unforeseen events, like unemployment, that may
hit some households and influence their disposable income.
Taxes taxw levied on wages are modelled in a progressive fashion, as reported in Equation (2). In
particular, we assume that the government charges two different tax rates, τw1 and τ
w
2 , with τ
w
1 < τ
w
2 .
The former is charged on wages lower than the median wage rate wˆt. Should households’ wages be higher
than threshold, τw2 applies to the part exceeding wˆi,t.
Disposable income ydi,t is then influenced by net financial payments. In Equation (1), rshi,t stands
for the rent that each household may receive on its eventual holding of IFs’ shares. Similarly, ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1
represents ‘effective’ interest payments done by household i to the banking system according to its own
specific interest rate rhi,t−1 and its outstanding debt stock Lhi,t−1.
In an economic system in which households’ debt represents not only a liability for the indebted units
but also a source of income for the family units holding IFs’ shares, households’ financial outlays and
entries are tightly connected and feed one another in a circular process. On the one hand, the remuneration
of IFs’ shares comes in part from returns on CDOs. These are affected by the capacity of households
to meet their financial commitments, which are then channeled to the bearers of the securities. On the
other hand, households capability to meet debt obligations may partially be influenced by the financial
income they receive from the IFs’ shares they hold. Indeed, this is the essence of the redistribution
process from debtors to rentiers, and the source of the ensuing rising inequality, that may take place in
modern financialized economies through the mechanisms of securitization.
In our model, we solve the simultaneous determination of households’ financial commitments and
financial rents through a recursive process. We first assume that, at the beginning of each period,
each individual household starts to set its own financial commitments out of its gross wage, once paid
taxes to the government and once a minimum amount of resources (c˜t) has been put aside for subsistence
consumption. Together with payments from households, CBs and IFs collect payments from other debtors
- i.e. NFFs and the government - and distribute them to (rentier) households in proportion to their share
holding. Remuneration of shares will be taken as a ‘pure’ addition to disposable income available for
consumption purposes and wealth accumulation by those household units which entirely set their pending
financial payments in the first round of the ‘payment process’. On the contrary, those households that
may still have some arrears will use the above financial income in order to pay, at least in part, what
is overdue. This triggers off a new round of redistribution of financial rents among share holders. We
assume such recursive process to come to an end when new financial income available to an individual
household represents less than 10 percent of its remaining interest commitments. In our model, at a
micro level, this last event stands for a sort of partial individual household’s default on its own interest
payments.
Once disposable income is defined, households decide their desired levels of consumption and assets
accumulation. As far as consumption is concerned (see Equation 3), each individual household sets its
desired level c∗i,t on the basis of the propensity to consume out of disposable income cy, and a ‘socially
determined’ consumption norm captured by the average consumption observed in the previous period
c¯t−1, multiplied by the parameter cn, which may be conceived as the strength of the social norm. The
social norm components serves the double scope of capturing the influence of the prevailing consumption
standard and the well known stylized fact that the propensity to consume decreases with income. In line
10From a theoretical point of view, this assumption is consistent with a Leontief production function characterising the
production process in the non-financial sector of the economy. For the sake of simplicity, in this model we do not consider
technological changes or innovation processes that modify the fixed combination of labour and capital in a Leontief-type
production process.
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with the recursive process described above, each individual household holds a sufficient amount of liquid
resources to achieve subsistence consumption c˜t, which is a share csub of last period median consumption.
Once established desired consumption, desired savings s∗ follows straightforwardly as the difference
between disposable income and desired consumption (see Equation (4)).
c∗i,t = cyydi,t + cnc¯t−1 (3)
s∗i,t = ydi,t − c∗i,t (4)
Equations (5) and (7) represent households’ desired portfolio choice. Equation (5) defines the desired
stock of deposits D∗i,t that each household wants to hold as a precautionary stance against unexpected
changes in disposable income and in order to maintain living standard rather stable. This is a given
share η of previous-year stock of wealth WHi,t−1. The ensuing desired variation in deposits is reported
in Equation (6). Equation (7) formalises households’ desired level of IFs’ shares. Each family unit wants
to increase or decrease its holding of IFs shares according to the difference between the observed return
on shares (rshi,t−1)/(Shi,t−1) and the interest rate on bond, which represents also the base rate of our
economy. In other words Equation (7) simply stresses that for each households the return on shares needs
to justify an eventual recourse to external financing. Should (rshi,t−1)/(Shi,t−1) be lower than iBi,t−1,
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it would indeed make sense to decumulate shares and repay back outstanding debts. In Equation (7),
parameter σ stands for households’ sensitiveness to the spread between the return on shares and the base
rate. Consistently with Equation (7), Equation (8) computes the desired variation in households’ share
stock. Equation (9), in turn, is the implicit desired budget constraint of each household. Indeed, it defines
the desired amount of new loans ∆Lh∗i,t that - given its desired consumption (savings) - household i asks
to CBs in order to implement the desired increase (decrease) in the stock of deposits and IFs shares.
Dh∗i,t = ηWHi,t−1 (5)
∆Dh∗i,t = Dh
∗ −Dhi,t−1 (6)
Sh∗i,t = Shi,t−1[1 + σ(
rshi,t−1
Shi,t−1
− iBi,t−1)] (7)
∆Sh∗i,t = Sh
∗
i,t − Shi,t−1 (8)
∆Lh∗i,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t + ∆Sh
∗
i,t − s∗i,t (9)
The capability of households’ to realize their plans depends on CBs’ willigness to accept their loan
requests. In our model, we assume CBs to perform an assessment of the creditworthiness of each single
household applying for a loan. In particular, CBs compare the household’s ‘desired’ debt service ratio
m∗i,t (see more about this below in the ‘banks behaviour’ block) to CBs’ risk aversion and propensity
to expand their business further. In our model, we capture this last point through ψt which depends
negatively on CBs’ current leverage with respect to the threshold leverage ratio k¯ (see more on this
below). In the event that m∗i,t < ψt, CBs will accept the loan application from household i, who will
be allowed to carry out its desired consumption and accumulation decisions. This is formally stated in
Equation (10) below:
if m∗i,t < ψt =⇒

∆Lhi,t = ∆Lh
∗
i,t
∆Shi,t = ∆Sh
∗
i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
(10)
In the event that m∗i,t > ψt, CBs will reject household’s application for bank’s credit. For the sake
of simplicity, we exclude the possibility for partial rationing at micro level (i.e. CBs will concede to
each household the requested loan or nothing). Nonetheless, partial rationing can still emerge at macro
level, when households sector is considered as a whole. Households getting their loan denied, adjust
11The interest rate on bond, iBi,t−1, plays the role of the base rate and proxies the potential cost of indebtedness.
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their original plans. When a household is exposed to this event, we assume it to follow a ‘pecking-order’
revision strategy. It will first scale down the accumulation of IFs shares, and perhaps even liquidate part
or all of them, in order to keep up with desired deposits and consumption levels. Revision of desired
deposits and, if necessary, reduction of the existing deposit stock will come next in order to meet the
desired consumption level. In the extreme case that disposable income and the existing deposit stock
could not provide enough resources to cover for desired consumptions, the household’s consumption will
reduce to the subsistence level c˜. The sequence of revisions in households’ choices is formally described
in the system of options (Equation 11):
if m∗i,t > ψt ⇒ Lhi,t = 0⇒

if s∗i,t > ∆Dh
∗
i,t ⇒

∆Shi,t > 0
∆Shi,t = s
∗
i,t −∆Dh∗i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t < ∆Dh
∗
i,t and s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1 > ∆Dh
∗
i,t ⇒

∆Shi,t < 0
∆Shi,t = s
∗
i,t −∆Dh∗i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t + Shi,t−1 < ∆Dh
∗
i,t and s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1 > 0⇒

Shi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = −Shi,t−1
∆Dhi,t > 0
∆Dhi,t = s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t + Shi,t−1 < 0 and s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1 +Dhi,t−1 > 0⇒

Shi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = −Shi,t−1
∆Dhi,t < 0
∆Dhi,t = s
∗
i,t + Shi,t−1
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if s∗i,t + Shi,t−1 +Dhi,t−1 < 0⇒

Shi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = −Shi,t−1
Dhi,t = 0
∆Dhi,t = −Dhi,t−1
ci,t ≥ c˜
ci,t = ydi,t + Shi,t−1 +Dhi,t−1
(11)
Wealthiest households may end up in an antithetical situation and generate a flow of savings that
outstrips the resources needed to accumulate the desired level of deposits and shares. In this scenario, we
assume that households will deleverage and pay back their loans. If the entire individual debt is repaid,
the household will keep any extra saving in the form of extra shares. From a formal point of view, this
final set of ‘allocation decisions’ kicks in when the left-hand-side of Equation (9), i.e. the desired amount
of new loans from commercial banks ∆Lh∗i,t gets negative. This last set of each individual household’s
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allocation decision is modelled by Equation (12):
if ∆Lh∗i,t < 0⇒

if Lhi,t−1 > ∆Lh∗i,t ⇒

Lhi,t = Lhi,t−1 −∆Lh∗i,t
∆Shi,t = ∆Sh
∗
i,t
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
if Lhi,t−1 ≤ ∆Lh∗i,t ⇒

Lhi,t = 0
∆Shi,t = ∆Sh
∗
i,t + [Lhi,t−1 −∆Lh∗i,t]
∆Dhi,t = ∆Dh
∗
i,t
ci,t = c
∗
i,t
(12)
4.2 Commercial Banks
As described in section 1, CBs and SPVs are at the core of the securitzing system. Accordingly, in our
model the overall banking sector - commercial banks and special puropse vehicles together - plays a major
role in shaping the behaviour of the economy through their decisions about credit rationing as well as
the amount of loans to securitize.
In our model, CBs create money by conceding loans to households and NFFs. As far as households’
loans are concerned, CBs decide whether to provide each single household with the demanded amount of
credit (i.e. ∆Lh∗) on the basis of two considerations. On the one hand, CBs will assess the creditworthi-
ness of each single potential borrower measured by the household-specific desired debt-service ratio. This
is formally represented in Equation (13) below, where E[rhi,t] is the expected interest rate that commercial
banks would apply to the updated household’s debt burden in the event of its application being accepted.
The expected interest rate that CBs will charge on new loans is defined by Equation (14). Given the higher
degree of risk of loans with respect to public bonds, CBs set household-specific interest rates through a
mark-up on returns on bonds. In Equation (14), CBs take the previous-period interest rate on public
bonds iBt−1 as starting point for interest rate determination. The positive spread between E[r
h
i,t] and i
B
t−1
is then established as a function of a household-specific reference debt-service ratio, which is computed
by applying the previous-period interest rate on bonds to the updated household’s debt stock over its
own disposable income. In Equation (14), ι stands for a positive parameter revealing CBs’ sensitiveness
to households’ reference debt-service ratio in the process of interest rate setting. It goes without saying
that the expected interest rate will become effective in the event that CBs will eventually concede the
new loans (see Equation (15)).
m∗i,t = E[r
h
i,t]
Lhi,t−1 + ∆Lh∗i,t
ydi,t
(13)
E[rhi,t] = i
B
t−1 + ιi
B
t−1
Lhi,t−1 + ∆Lh∗i,t
ydi,t
(14)
if m∗i,t < ψt and ∆Lhi,t = ∆Lh
∗
i,t then r
h
i,t = E[r
h
i,t] (15)
As already described in section 4.1, CBs will grant new loans depending on each household specific
desired debt service ratio being lower than CBs’ aversion to risk. We assume CBs’ risk aversion to be
represented by the time-varying parameter ψt, as formally described by Equation (16):
ψt = max
(
ψ¯, ψ¯ + ω(kt−1 − k))
)
(16)
kB,t =
BB,t
[(1− zt)Lt +BB,t] (17)
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The value of ψt is negatively influenced by CBs’ levarage (1/kB) - see Equation (17). In our model,
CBs hold two different types of assets: risk-free public bonds BB and riskier loans conceded to both
households and NFFs, i.e. L = (Lh+Lf ). Consistently with standard banks regulation as internationally
enshrined in the Basel accords, public bonds holding is ranked at the status of own capital. Accordingly,
we take the ratio of CBs’ government bonds over total CBs’ assets, i.e. kB , as an inverse measure of
CBs’ leverage. This is compared with a threshold leverage ratio k as given by standard CBs’ regulatory
capital requirements. The higher kB the lower CBs’ leverage, and the more likely the concession of the
loans. On the contrary, in the event that CBs’ portfolio composition would be relatively skewed towards
riskier loans, CBs will be more reluctant to grant the loan. In Equation (16), we weight the importance
of portfolio composition and leverage over CBs’ loan policy through parameter ω2, with ω2 > 0. The
impacts of different value of the parameters will be tested in the simulation presented in the following
section.
There is one more point, which is worth stressing, about loans and capital requirements. In the age
of securitization and shadow banking, CBs can actively manage both the liability and asset side of their
balance sheets. Active asset management takes place through the securitization of a share z of existing
CBs-created loans. Botta et al. (2018) show that the traditional banking sector can reduce its leverage
by oﬄoading part of their loans onto the balance sheet of SPV. And this will in turn create the possibility
for CBs to give rise to a new round of loans creation. In this paper, we capture this fact by reporting
the endogenous securitization share z at the demonimator of Equation (15). The higher the demand for
CDOs, the higher the demand for securitized loans, and the more easily CBs will raise z, reduce their
leverage (i.e. increase kB) and ultimately ‘create new space’ for the generation of new assets. Indeed, the
process of financialization can be interpreted as the growth of a hypertrophic financial sector creating an
enormous amount of financial assets and, correspondingly, financial liabilities. What allows this dynamics
to develop is the distribution of mounting (and eventually unsustainable) financial liabilities across the
whole economic system, hence the externalization of creditors’ risks, thanks to the selling, pooling, and
trancing of credits, which is at the heart of the securitizing system. The attempt of understanding the
development of a modern rentier-friendly economy cannot depart from the analysis of the way securities
are created.
Loans to the non-financial productive sector are relatively simpler. The determination of the interest
rate to be applied on the loan NFFs (rft ) is very similar to what shown in Equation (14) for expected
interest rate on households’ loans. Also in this case, CBs will take the previous-period interest rate
on public bonds iBt−1 as ‘starting point’, i.e. as minimum interest rate to apply on any conceded loan.
The banking sector will then determine the positive spread between rft and i
B
t−1 as a function of NFFs’
debt service ratio. This is the ratio between the updated ‘reference’ cost of external financing, measured
applying the previous-period interest rate on bond to the revised NFFs’ debt stock over their net profits
Pft - see Equation (18). As before, ι is a positive parameter capturing CBs’ sensitiveness to the debt
service ratio of the overall non-financial productive sector.
rft = i
B
t−1 + ιi
B
t−1
Lft−1 + ∆Lf∗t
Pft
(18)
As in the case of loans to households, CBs can ration credit given to the macro-aggregated non-financial
productive sector. Once again, CBs’ decisions will hinge upon the comparison between NFFs’ debt-service
ratio (as measured by NFFs’ desired interest payments over NFFs’ profits) and CBs’ adversion to risk as
captured by parameter ψt (see more details on credit rationing to NFFs in the NFF section).
The last point to consider for this sector is commercial banks’ decisions about the purchase of govern-
ment bonds. For sake of simplicity, in this paper we integrate primary and secondary markets for public
bonds, which are bought by CBs and IFs. IFs will demand public bonds according to the optimal allo-
cation of collected funds among available assets, i.e. public bonds and CDOs (see more on this below in
the investment funds block). CBs, in turn, will buy the residual amount of available public bonds unsold
on the market. In this regard, the behaviour of CBs is consistent with how the allocation of public bonds
among financial operators effectively works in the US economy, where a certain amount of public bonds
is allocated, by default, to non-competitive bidders regardless of the interest rate bid they make in public
bonds’ auctions. Moreover, primary dealers are the main players in this market, as they are explicitly
14
required to take part to every auction and to make reasonable market for government securities. In our
model, the buffer and market-maker functions that primary dealers perform in the US financial system
is formalised by CBs filling any possible gap between the supply of public bonds and IFs’ demand. This
said, the interest rate on bonds will be determined by market forces and will depend on whether CBs
will have to increase their relative share of public bonds holding (with respect to the previous period) in
order to clear the market (see more on this below). More in details, a relatively low demand for bonds
(at least with respect to the supply) from IFs would imply first that CBs increase their contribution to
the market for public securities, second that the returns on public bonds will raise. On the contrary, a
considerable demand for public bonds from IFs would cause a squeeze in the buffer role of CBs and would
imply a reduction in the interest rate on public bond. This mimics the distinction between competitive
and non competitive bidders, where the former, whose demand set the price, are here represented by
the IFs. Equation (19) formally expresses the buffer action carried out by CBs on the market for public
bonds and shows that, given the total supply of public bonds on financial markets GDt and the quantity
of bonds IFs want to hold on their balance sheets, i.e. BIF,t (see more on this later), the remaining will
be allocated to CBs.
BB,t = GDt −BIF,t (19)
The flow of revenues that CBs receive from their activity of providing loans to households and non-
financial firms as well as holding bonds (and consistently with the securitization of part of the created
loans) are reported in the series of Equations (20), (21), and (22) below. Equation (23) finally gives CBs
total profits, which, as explained in section 3, are transferred to the IFs sector.
RLhB,tt =
N∑
i=1
(1− zt−1)[ ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1] (20)
RLfB,t = (1− zt−1)[rft−1Lft−1] (21)
RBB,t = r
b
t−1BB,t−1 (22)
ΠB,t = RL
h
B,t +RL
f
B,t +RBB,t (23)
4.3 Special Purpose Vehicles
Special purpose vehicles play an important role, although rather passive, in the process of securitization
and creation of structured financial products (CDOs). Indeed, thier balance sheets is where securitised
loans are stored in order to enable CBs to further expand credit. Special purpose vehicles package
securitised loans together in order to create an apparently safer asset (i.e. CDOs), to the benefit of
rentiers. Other way around, SPVs are the institutions allowing the financial system as a whole to give
rise to the so-called ‘originate-and-distribute’ practice replacing the ‘originate-and-hold’ practice that
traditionally characterised the process of bank loans creation. The relevant function SPVs perform in
our model is formalised by Equations (24), (25), and (26) below:
zt
N∑
i=1
Lhi,t + ztLft = CDOif,t (24)
zt = min(1,
CDOIF
Lt
) (25)
rcdot =
zt[(
∑N
i=1
˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1) + r
f
t−1Lft−1]
CDOif,t−1
(26)
Equation (24) simply says that, in each period, the asset side of SPVs’ balance sheets is made up
of a portion zt of all the loans originally created by CBs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
zt is homogeneous across loan categories, i.e. CBs securitise on demand an equal portion of all the
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loans created so far through their lending activity, regardless of the (household-) specific level of risk
characterising any single loan. The liability side of SPVs is in turn represented by CDO created by
SPVs themselves, and purchased on financial markets by IFs. Equation (25) defines the extent of the
securitization process with respect to the original lending activity performed by CBs. Given the natural
supply constraint as determined by the total amount of loans generated through time by the banking
system, we assume zt to be demand-driven and endogenously determined in each period by the demand
for CDOs from IFs. In our economy, CDOs stand for the complex structured financial products so widely
demanded by IFs and so aggressively produced by investment banks (SPVs in our model) before the
outbreak of the last financial crisis. Securitised loans are the raw material provided by CBs and used as
intermediate inputs by SPVs for the production of CDOs. Accordingly, the higher the demand for CDOs,
the higher the demand for loans to securitize from SPVs, and the higher the proportion of existing loans
entering the securitization process. In this sense, it is worth noting that a downsizing of special purpose
vehicles, due to the break down of investors confidence in the degree of safety of CDOs, would imply a
drop in the demand for CDOs and the dry-up of the securitization chain. CBs would not only be forced
to reduce the extent by which they can securitize, but they will have to reload on their balance sheet
some of the loans previously oﬄoaded and reduce the activism and benevolent approach in the concession
of new loans.
Equation (26) finally shows how financial revenues are distributed throughout the whole economic
system through the securitization process and the production of CDOs. Indeed, SPVs and IFs form a
arm-length chain through which interests, originally paid by indebted households and NFFs, eventually
accrue to (rentier) households as financial income on their (indirect) holding, mediated by IFs, of CDOs.
In this sense, Equation (26) also says that the remunerativeness and appealing (as investment opportu-
nities) of CDOs is closely related to (indebted) households’ capability to meet their interest payments on
outstanding debt. Indeed, the lower the effective interest payments ˜rhi,t−1Lhi,t−1 made by households on
their own debt, as due to the unsustainability of their financial position, the lower the remunerativeness
of each issued CDO with respect to its ‘face value’. Accordingly, IFs will likely re-orient their portfo-
lio towards less remunerative but safer (in particular during times of financial turmoil) assets, namely
public bonds. Other way around, we could say that the viability of the SB system - and of the assets
it produces - relies on an unstable equilibrium between the creation of an increasing amount of financial
liabilities/assets and the preservation of good households’ financial ‘solvency’ The over-indebtedness of
US households and the inclusion of sub-prime mortgages in the production of CDOs ultimately caused
the disruption of the financial system at the base of which they lay.
4.4 Investment Funds
The last component of the financial system of our model are Investment Funds (IFs). As already stressed
in section 3, IFs act as financial intermediaries collecting funds from households and deploying them to
purchase financial assets. The financial revenues of IFs’ investment - i.e. interests on public bonds and
remuneration of CDOs - are ultimately distributed to (rentier) households as remuneration of their shares
holding. Equations describe how IFs allocate collected funds among the different possible deployments,
and the ensuing streams of IFs’ revenues and payments (to rentiers).
DIF,t = ηSHt (27)
qbif,t = q
b
if,t−1(1− β[(rcdot − iBt )− (rcdot−1 − iBt−1)] (28)
BDIF,t = q
b
if,tSHt(1− σ) (29)
CDODIF,t = SHt(1− σ)−BIF,t (30)
CDOIF,t = min(ztLt, CDO
D
IF,t) (31)
Equation (27) firstly says that IFs always want to keep a relatively small share σ of collected funds
SHt in the form of banks’ deposit. This decision is linked to a precautionary stance meant to provide
IFs with the required liquidity in the event that rentiers would like to redeem some shares. Total
IFs’ resources available for financial investments on interest-bearing assets therefore amount to (1 −
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σ)SHt. Equation (28) establishes the share of deployable resources q
b
if,t IFs would like to allocate to the
purchase of government bonds. We model such portfolio allocation decision by looking at the relative
remunerativeness of government bonds with respect to CDOs. In particular, IFs increase the share of
available funds devoted to the purchase of public bonds when the spread between CDOs and government
bonds, i.e. (rcdot − iBt ) is lower than the spread registered in the previous period i.e. (rcdot−1− iBt−1). Other
way around, given the higher degree of risk associated to CDOs with respect to public bonds, a reduction
of the spread between the former and the latter will induce IFs to allocate an increasing share of available
funds to bonds holding. In Equation (28), β reveals the sensitiveness of IFs portfolio decisions to changes
in the spread between available assets.
Consistently with Equations (27) and (28), Equation (29) defines the demand for public bonds from
IFs, whilst Equation (30) gives the ensuing demand for CDOs. Equation (31) finally shows that IFs’
demand for CDO (CDODIF,t) cannot exceed the maximum amount of CDOs potentially producible by the
securitizing system (given by the total amount of existing loans that could potentially be securitised).
Both the CDO and Bonds’ market may occasionally be supply-constrained. May this occur, the excess
demand will take the form of liquidity hence increasing the stock of IFs’ deposits.
Financial investments by IFs obviously give rise to a stream of financial revenues which constitute
the total amount of resources that IFs will divert to rentier households as remuneration of their shares.
On top of this, IFs also receive profits from CBs since, as we said, we assumed that the former owns the
latter. We assume banks dividends to be held in the form of deposits by the IFs sector. This may be
conceived as the cumulation of wealth by the financial sector. More specifically, Equations (32) and (33)
define the revenues IFs will get on CDOs and bonds holding, respectively. Equation (34) determines the
total set of payables to rentiers. The remuneration (rentier) households will eventually get from IF shares
is expressed by Equation (35), and it is proportional to the amount of shares each individual household
‘i’ holds (i.e. shi,t−1) with respect to the total amount of shares issued so far by IFs, i.e. SHt−1.
RCDOIF,t = r
cdo
t−1CDO (32)
RBIF,t = r
b
t−1BIF,t−1 (33)
RSHt = RCDOIF,t +RBIF,t (34)
rshi,t = RSH
shi,t−1
SHt−1
(35)
4.5 Non-financial Firms
In this paper, we assume the NFFs to be a simple macro-aggregated sector producing a homogenous good
used both for consumption and investment purposes. Production decisions by NFFs are demand-driven
and satisfy the demand for consumption, investment, and public purchases emerging in the economy.
Equation (36) defines consumption expenditures as the sum of each individual household realised con-
sumption. Equation (37), in turn, defines the demand for new capital goods. First of all, we assume that
the demand for capital goods depends positively on previous-period firms’ profitability. Following Badhuri
and Marglin (1992), the profitability of the macro-aggregated non-financial productive sector is captured
by the profit share pit−1 = (ΠF,t−1/Yt−1), with ΠF,t−1 as previous-period NFFs gross profits, and Yt−1
as previous period Gross Domestic Product (GDP). On top of this, NFFs’ investment demand also re-
sponds positively to the observed (previous-period) rate of capacity utilization, i.e. ut−1 = (Yt−1/Kt−1).
In Equation (37), γ1 and γ2 are positive parameters, γ2 being the well-known Harrod-type accelerator.
Finally, there is an ‘animal spirits’ component, that is the stochastic process described in Equation (38),
weighted by γ3. The ensuing process of capital accumulation is reported in Equation (39), with parameter
δ as the depreciation rate of the existing capital stock. Given public purchases (to be explained in the
government box), Equation (40) eventually defines GDP Yt, whilst Equation (41) identifies non-financial
firms’ gross profits as the difference between revenues from production and selling activity and the wage
bill paid to workers.
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Ct =
N∑
i=1
ci,t (36)
It = γ1
Πt−1
Yt−1
+ γ2ut−1 + γ3Zt (37)
Zt = γ4Zt−1 + U(0, 0.1) (38)
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + I (39)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (40)
ΠF,t = Ct + It +Gt −Wt (41)
pit =
ΠF,t
Yt
(42)
We assume that NFFs do not distribute dividends, hence they retain all their net operative profits
PF,t once paid corporate taxes to the government and interest rates on outstanding loans to the banking
system. This is formalised by Equation (43). In Equation (43), τ3 is the governmental tax rate levied on
NFFs’ gross profits (see Equation (44) for the total amount of taxes paid by NFFs), whilst RLf stands
for interest payments from NFFs towards the financial system. Equation (45) straightforwardly defines
NFFs’ financial payment commitments as given by the ruling interest rate on loans to NFFs rlf,t−1 and
the outstanding NFFs’ debt stock Lft−1.
At any period, NFFs wants to hold a certain amount of liquid assets, i.e. CBs’ deposits, in order to
cover for unexpected events, say increases in the wage bill or maintenance costs of installed capital goods.
NFFs set the desired amount of liquid assets as a positive proportion µ of the capital stock (see Equation
(46). The ensuing change in NFFs’ stock of deposits follows immediately as reported in Equation (47).
Pft = (1− τ3)ΠF,t −RLf,t (43)
Tf,t = τ3ΠF,t (44)
RLft = r
l
f,t−1L
f
t−1 (45)
Df,t = ηKt (46)
∆Df,t = Dff,t −Df,t−1 (47)
∆Lft = I − Pft + ∆Df,t (48)
Lft = Lft−1 + ∆Lft (49)
Equation (48) defines the budget constraint of the whole non-financial productive sector, once its
demand for new capital goods, net operative profits, and desired change in liquid asset holdings have
been identified.
Equation (48) simply says that NFFs will fully retain their net operative profits in order to finance
the purchases of new capital goods as well as to increase their liquid assets. In the event available profits
not being enough, NFFs will resort to credit from CBs. Also in this case credit rationing may occur.
However this time, also in consideration of NFFs being an aggregate sector, the rationing is partial. The
banking sector will grant credit to NFFs as long as the ratio between NFFs’ net profits and financial
commitments does not exceed ψt. Whenever this occurs loan is extended up to the threshold and NFFs
need to diminish their deposits in order to finance their investment decisions.
4.6 Government
The last sector to describe is the government. In this regards, the first set of equations below define
government’s revenues (see Equation (50)) - given by taxes on households’ wages and profits of NFFs -
and government outlays. We decided to maintain the behaviour of the public sector as simple as possible,
hence we assume that public purchases are set as a share ξ of previous-period aggregate consumption
Ct−1.
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On top of public purchases, the government has to meet interest payments on the outstanding amount
of public debt. The costs of servicing public debt are reported in Equation (52).
Tt = τ3ΠF,t +
N∑
i=1
τwj wi,t (50)
Gt = ξCt−1 (51)
GDSt = r
b
t−1GDt−1 (52)
The difference between government outlays and tax revenues determines the public deficit in each
period of our model. This is formally stated in Equation (53) below. Public deficit is in turn financed by
issuing new government bonds, which will raise the stock of public debt (see Equation (54)).
∆GDt = Gt − Tt −GDSt (53)
GDt = GDt−1 + ∆GDt (54)
Public bonds issued on financial markets in previous periods (and constituting the existing stock
of public debt) plus the issuance of new government bonds aimed at financing current public deficit,
determine the total supply of public securities. As already described in the previous sections of this
paper, CBs and IFs are the purchasers of government bonds according to the different roles they perform
in financial markets. In our model, we assume that yields on public bonds are determined by market
mechanisms through the interaction between supply and demand. More in details, consistently with the
behaviour of IFs and CBs, we assume a recursive mechanism to take place. First, the total supply of
public bonds is defined (Equation (54)). Given the realised return on CDOs, as well as previous-period
interest rate on public bonds, which constitutes the starting bid for the new round of government bonds’
auctions, IFs declare which amount of public bonds, at the prevailing interest rate, they would like to
hold in their portfolio. CBs come next. They make their bid for the remaining part of public bonds in
excess with respect to the demand from IFs. In the event that CBs would have to increase their share
of public bonds (over total supply) with respect to the previous period in order to clear the market,
CBs will ask for higher yields. Alternatively, should their buffer and market-maker role go downsized
given buoyant demand for bonds from IFs, CBs’ bids on public bonds’ yields will show a downward
orientation. A second round of bids now starts, with IFs revising and updating their own demand for
bonds on the basis of what emerged in the last round and consistently with the observed behaviour of
CBs. In each round the interest rate adjusts depending on the parameter φ which governs the speed of
adjustment of the process. Such a sequence of bids eventually comes to an end when further increases or
reductions in yields on public bonds do not induce any further adjustment – namely the process hits the
stopping condition related to the parameter ¯ – in the demand from IFs and, as a consequence, in the
buffer purchase from CBs. The complex mechanism we assume behind the determination of yields on
government bonds is formalised by Equation (55) below, where we assume rbt to be a positive function of
the share of public bonds (over total supply) CBs will eventually hold on their balance sheet at the end
of bid rounds just described.
rbt = r
b
t−1[1 + α(
BB,t
GDt
− BB,t−1
GDt−1
)] (55)
5 Simulations
Our hybrid AB-SFC model does not aim at reproducing the historical time series characterising a specific
economy, or at accurately forecasting the future evolution of the variables at stake in a particular country.
Our analysis is qualitative in its essence: we aim at analysing the co-evolution of finance and inequality
in a stylised financialised economy from a theoretical point of view. For this reason, the initialisation
of our simulations does not resemble the current state of any specific economy. It rather starts from a
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sort of ‘virtual’ economy with only an initial capital stock equal to 1. Accordingly, all other stocks are
set to zero. Given this initial setting, we run simulations over one thousand periods in order to let the
‘structural properties’ (i.e. the relationship between inequality and finance, as well as between finance
and the real economy) of the economy develop and assume meaningful values. The list of parameters is
reported in Table 1. In what follows, both statistics and plots are referred to the period 501-1000, so to
get rid of transient dynamics. All simulations are checked for accounting consistency, in line with SFC
literature (Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Caverzasi and Godin, 2014), both at individual and sectoral level.
Symbol Description Baseline
T Number of periods 1000
N Number of households 1000
τ1 Lower tax rate on income 0.2
τ2 Higher tax rate on income 0.4
τ3 Tax rate on profit 0.5
γ1 Profit share weight (investment function) 0.2
γ2 Capacity utilization weight (investment function) 0.01
γ3 Animal spirit weight (investment function) 0.1
γ4 Weight of the autoregressive component (investment function) 0.9
η Precautionary deposits 0.2
β Weight of CDO/Bond spread in IF portfolio allocation 10
σ Sensitivity to return on share/base rate spread (household portfolio choice) 1
φ Speed of adjustment in public bonds’ bids 0.01
ω Sensitivity to distance from desired share of bonds (banks credit rationing) 0.3
ι Sensitiveness to the debt service ratio (interest rate setting) 1
 Tolerance in recursive processes (bonds and return on share determination) 0.1
k¯ Desired share of bonds in banks’ portfolio 0.4
cy Propensity to consume out of income 0.8
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.03
λ1 Wage bill’s determination out of capital 0.15
ξ Public purchases’ determination out of capital 0.6
θ Log-standard deviation (wage distribution) 0.5
csub Subsistence consumption 0.25
cn ‘Socially determined’ consumption 0.2
Table 1: Parameters
The first computational experiment we perform includes two sets of multiple (Monte Carlo) simula-
tions: (i) 100 simulations of the model without securitization (No Securitization), namely a scenario in
which securitization does not take place (i.e. z = 0) and the portfolio choice of IFs is therefore limited to
either deposits or public bonds, and (ii) 100 simulations of the model with securitization (Securitization),
where banks securitize a portion z of their loans, varying with households’ demand for financial assets,
as described in Section 3. Results are reported in Table 2.
The comparison between these two scenarios suggests that GDP growth appears to benefit from
securitization. While the shares of the different components of GDP are very similar, public debt is
considerably higher without securitization. Conversely private debt, both as a stock over GDP and
with respect to total net income (i.e. net wage plus the rents from IFs shares) is higher in the case
of securitization. The Securitization scenario is also characterized by higher levels of both income and
wealth inequality, and this seems to confirm the role played by securitization in favouring the rent-seeking
activity of richer households, as described in our analysis in Section 1. The higher inequality and private
indebtedness linked with securitization lead to higher financial fragility. Indeed, the probability of a
financial crisis (here arbitrary captured by a thresholds of unpaid interests on non performing loans above
5% of total interests) is more than four times higher when the financial system can rely on securitization.
20
To sum up, while securitization appears to be beneficial for growth, as it makes easier for banks to provide
loans to the private sectors, the boost in credit creation gives rise to higher inequality and more financial
instability. Lower income households are indeed recurrently unable to service their debts and need to
cut consumption below their desired level. A word of caution is in order. The absence of an asset which
may loose value, as in a Fisherian debt-deflation crisis (Fisher, 1933), the aggregate CBs, SPVs, and IFs
sectors, with the consequent lack of financial units defaulting, make the model resilient to crisis.
No Securitization Securitization
GDP growth
- mean 0.0243 0.0249
- Standard Deviation 0.0161 0.0155
- Skewness -0.0675 -0.0594
- Kurtosis 2.0489 2.0470
GDP level∗ 0.5761 1
GDP shares
- Consumption 0.5457 0.5464
- Investment 0.1269 0.1257
- Public Purchases 0.3274 0.3278
Public Debt 2.5884 1.8076
Gini Indexes
- Income 0.2789 0.2912
- Wealth 0.7188 0.7373
Loan Stock over GDP 1.6343 1.7565
Debt to income ratio 0.9519 0.9950
Non-Performing Loans∗∗
- Mean 0.0120 0.0112
- Standard Deviation 0.0017 0.0020
- Skewness 0.3534 0.6090
- Kurtosis 2.6159 2.8785
- Crisis Probability∗∗∗ 0.0120 0.0530
Share of securitized loans 0 0.2855
∗ GDP last period baseline = 1
∗∗ Unpaid over due interests on loans
∗∗∗ Unpaid interest related to NPL above 5% of all interests
Table 2: Descriptive statistics comparing the baseline scenario (‘No Securitization’ ) with the ‘Securitiza-
tion’ scenario.
Given these general features of our simulated economy, let’s have a deeper look at the results of our
simulations as to the joint evolution of the domestic financial sector and of inequality standards. We
first look at the developments of the financial system with and without securitisation by analysing the
the plots of a single simulation (which represents the typical dynamics already summarized above).
Among other things, we will pay particular attention to the capability of the financial sector to generate
an increasing amount of loans thanks to the possibility to subsequently securitise part of them. We
will then check for the effect of securitisation and the diffusion of structured financial products on the
evolution of both income and wealth inequality. We capture the evolution of inequality standards through
the computation of the Gini index over gross income and gross wealth for the whole set of one thousand
households composing our economy. We will finally describe the main qualitative properties characterising
the occurrence of endogenous crises as linked to unfolding dynamics in the financial sphere of the economy.
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5.1 Financial dynamics with and without securitization
The four panels included in Figure 1 describe some relevant features of our simulated financial system.
We particularly pay attention to how financial dynamics change according to the existence (or not) of
securitisation. The functioning of the financial system without securitisation is represented by the blue
dashed line. Financial dynamics associated to securitisation are represented by the orange solid line.
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Figure 1: Descriptive Plots 1. The orange solid line is the scenario with securitization, the blue dashed line is without
securitization (baseline scenario).
The upper-left panel in Figure 1 shows the total stock of loans (as a share of GDP) extended by CBs
to the economy as a whole. It clearly shows the persistently higher amount of loans CBs can provide to
the economy under securitisation. This is obviously due to the possibility CBs have to create new loans
and then unburden their financial positions by putting part of them off their balance sheets. According to
this panel, CBs persistently create about 10 percent more loans (as a share of GDP) when securitisation
and ‘originate-and-distribute’ practices are allowed. Results portrayed in Figure 1 also show that such an
upward drift is not constant. Indeed, our simulated economy experiences a credit boom around periods
750 and 800, when the stock of loans increases up to above 200 percent of GDP. This figure is roughly
40 percentage points more than in the baseline scenario excluding securitisation. Such an astonishing
increase in the total stock of loans, and the ensuing rising degree of indebtedness of the economy as a
whole, is then followed by an abrupt contraction. The credit boom eventually goes wrong and a quite
standard credit boom-and-bust cycle takes place (see more on this below).
The evolution of credit inside the economy is obviously connected to the dynamics of the other
financial variables reported in Figure 1. In the upper-right panel of Figure 1, we show the evolution of
‘z’, i.e. the total amount of securitised loans. It is important to keep in mind that in our model, ‘z’ is
an endogenous variable, which depends on the demand for CDOs of which securitised loans are primary
inputs. In our model, the securitisation of existing loans is indeed a pre-condition for the production of
CDOs. And the production of CDOs is in turn meant to satisfy the appetite for high returns by rentier
households. When securitisation is allowed, CBs generally put about 30 percent of existing loans out
of their balance sheet. The bottom-right panel of Figure 1 shows how financial innovations such as the
creation of structured financial products and the inclusion of CDOs in the portfolio of IFs considerably
increased the remunerativeness of IFs shares with respect to the baseline scenario (in which only the
interest on bonds contributes to the remuneration of shares).
The ratio of securitised loans is not constant. Interestingly, it tends to decrease during the credit
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bubble and in the run-up to the crisis. The reason why this happens can be fully grasped by jointly
analysing the bottom-left and bottom-right panel of Figure 1. The considerable increase of loans extended
to the private sector helps the economy to grow faster. At the same time, however, it makes households
and non-financial firms increasingly indebted. As the bottom-left panel reveals, a rise in the rate of
non-performing loans takes place, as over-indebted households do not meet their interest payments.
More in details, from period 700 on, the fraction of unpaid interest over due interests related to non-
performing loans turns higher in the ‘Securitisation’ scenario than in the case without securitisation. It
eventually skyrockets at time 800. It is by no means incidental that this trend unfolds alongside with an
increasing gap between the stock of loans created under securitisation (orange solid line) with respect to
the baseline scenario (blue dashed line). The increase in non-performing loans in turn bears a obvious
negative impact on the effective remuneration of CDOs and, consequently, IFs’ shares. In the bottom-
right panel, a reduction in the remuneration of shares appears from period 700. Whilst this reduces
households’ demand for IFs’ shares, it also causes a drop in the amount of funds IFs allocate to CDOs
(see more on this below), and hence in the demand for securitised loans. In the end, the increase in
the amount of loans extended to the economy and a lower demand for securitised loans jointly cause a
decrease in the degree of securitisation ‘z’ observed in our economy between periods 700 and 800.
The ratio of securitised loans starts to increase again after the burst of the credit bubble when CBs
considerably reduce the amount of loans extended to the economy. On top of this, tighter rationing
ensures loans are given to a (relatively) restricted number of creditworthy counterparts. The ensuing
increase in the effective remuneration of CDOs and IFs’ shares brings back a high enough demand for
CDOs and securitised loans, and contributes to rise ‘z’ to pre-crisis-levels.
Figure 2 provides some insights about the behaviour of the financial sector. The upper-left and the
bottom-left panels in Figure 2 show the share of public bonds in IFs’ portfolio and the dynamics of public
bonds’ yields, respectively. In particular, they show the so-called ‘flight to quality’ that generally takes
place when first rumours and symptoms of a financial crisis spread. In the upper-left panel, when the
rise in non-performing loans reduces the remunerativeness of CDOs, IFs decide to divert collected funds
towards risk-free government bonds. The market for CDOs shrinks and the share of public bonds in IFs
portfolio increases.12 Such a rather dramatic (although temporary) switch in the investment decisions of
IFs brings to a reduction in the yields on government bonds. The temporary reduction in government
bonds’ yields is considerably more pronounced in the securitisation scenario than in the baseline scenario.
This might be taken as a first sign of the greater instability and propensity to give rise to episodes of
‘flight to quality’, which characterises modern financial systems.
The above impression that financial shocks can more easily take place in the context of a financial
system with securitisation is confirmed by the upper-right and the bottom-right panels in Figure 2. The
first one tells us that securitisation contributes to maintain CBs’ leverage under control (and actually very
close to the ‘benchmark’) even in presence of a considerably more active creation of loans (see upper-left
panel in Figure 1). At the same time, when the credit boom unfolds (from period 700 to about 800),
CBs’ leverage (as captured by the inverse of the capital adequacy ratio 1/k) skyrockets. This would
not happen in the baseline scenario without securitisation, since that CBs would stop much earlier the
expansion of credit given to the economy. In the end, securitisation reduces the aversion to risk of CBs,
and allows them to reduce rationing and extend loans even to risky counterparts. This would have not
happened had CBs been forced to keep all the created loans on their own balance sheets.
Interestingly, loose borrower screening by CBs during the credit boom is replaced by much tighter
rationing (in absolute terms and with respect to the baseline) when the credit boom goes burst. After
period 800, 25 percent of households are rationed (see bottom-right panel), and a sort of credit crunch
takes place. This fact will obviously bring the economic system towards a recession (more on this below).
12The upper-left panel in Figure 2 reports the share of funds IFs allocate to public bonds for the case with securitisation
only. Indeed, in the baseline scenario without securitisation, IFs would allocate all the collected funds to public bonds given
the absence of any alternative investment opportunity, namely CDOs. The share of IFs’ resources allocated to bonds would
then be persistently equal to 1. The graphical representation of such a baseline scenario would ‘visually’ blur the ‘flight to
quality’ phenomenon, which takes place when securitisation and CDOs are allowed, and signs of financial dislocation start
to emerge. Therefore, we don not display the line in the baseline scenario.
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Figure 2: Descriptive Plots 2. The orange solid line is the scenario with securitization, the blue dashed line is without
securitization (baseline scenario).
5.2 Inequality
Figures 3 and 4 help us to understand how the spread of modern financial practices, namely securitisation
and the production of CDOs, do affect inequality standards. The left-panel in Figure 3 shows the evolution
of the Gini index as computed on the distribution of gross income over one thousand households. The
right-panel in Figure 3 shows the same inequality index now related to gross wealth. What emerges
clearly from both panels is that income and wealth inequality reaches higher levels when modern financial
practices develop with respect to a ‘traditional’ financial world without securitisation and CDOs.
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Figure 3: Inequality. The two graphs represent respectively the Gini index on income and wealth. The orange solid line
is the scenario with securitization, the blue dashed line is without securitization (baseline scenario).
It is important to make some more points on the persistence of inequality. First, wealth inequality
24
does not show any relevant sign of reduction, and it rather increases when a credit boom takes place, both
with and without securitisation. This is due to the fact that whilst wealthy households increase their stock
of wealth without recurring to loans (see more on this below), a larger number of middle and low-class
households get indebted just to maintain consumption levels without accumulating any form of financial
wealth. Income inequality shows a stable path when securitisation is out of the picture. This comes from
the fact that the remuneration of financial investment from wealthy households exclusively depend on
public bonds’ yields rather than on more remunerative but far more volatile composite CDOs’ yields.
Income inequality reaches persistently higher but more unstable levels when securitisation and CDOs
emerge. In particular, income inequality decreases when the symptoms of a financial crisis unfold. This
is due to the fact that when credit booms develop, an increasing number of over-indebted households and
firms do not set their interest payments, which in turn constitute the remuneration of rentier households’
(indirect) investment in CDOs (via IFs’ share).
The upper-left panel in Figure 3 shows that such a reduction in income inequality is purely transitory.
Indeed, when financial markets restore their soundness after the outbreak of a full-fledge crisis, and only
creditworthy borrowers are granted a loan, the distribution of ‘exploitation rents’ associated with the
production of CDOs starts again together with a new rise in income inequality. In a way, this finding is
consistent with the recent empirical evidence put forward by Piketty (2014) as to inequality dynamics in
the aftermath of the most recent financial crisis. According to Piketty (2014), whilst income inequality
has decreased during the crisis, it has quickly returned to even higher levels soon after. In the end, the
outbreak of a full-blown financial shocks seem to emerge as temporary interruptions of much deeper and
structural dynamics in the joint evolution of financial systems and inequality.
Figure 4 provides some more information about wealth inequality, as emerging in the last period of
simulation. Indeed, it shows the distribution of net wealth among all the one thousand family units
composing our economy. Again, what emerges clearly is that net wealth is more polarised when we
include securitisation and CDOs in our model than in the baseline scenario.
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Figure 4: Net worth distribution. The graph represents the distribution of net wealth among households in the two main
scenarios. The orange solid line is the scenario with securitisation, the blue dashed line is without securitisation (baseline
scenario).
According to Figure 4, modern financial practices allow net wealth to become increasingly more
concentrated in the top 10 percent households of the wealth distribution. On the contrary, the 50 percent
households at the bottom of the distribution register a reduction of their net wealth. Some of them even
enter in ‘negative territory’. The increasing amount of loans they have to take in board just for satisfying
consumption purposes and to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ force them to accumulate a negative net wealth.
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Figure 5: Flows Ratios. The two top graphs and the bottom-left graph show the weight of each monetary source on
total outflows. The bottom-right graph represents the ratio between income and stock of debt. The blue dots represent the
(baseline) scenario without securitisation and the red circles the scenario with securitisation. The four graphs show results
from the last period of simulation. Households are ranked from the richest (left) to the poorest (right).
The financial flows that originate from such an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth are reported
in Figure 5. The upper-left panel in Figure 5 shows that net wage covers for 90 percent of all current
outlays (both for consumption or investment purposes) of top income households. The upper-right panel
also shows that the production of CDOs and the higher remunerativeness of IFs’ shares (with respect
to the baseline scenario) allowed to increase the relevance of financial income in the budget of rentier
households. Whilst financial income accounted for less than 2 percent (of households’ outlays) in a world
without securitisation, it has increased up to almost 10 percent after securitisation takes place and CDOs
are produced. This obviously goes to the benefit of those rich households, which are wealthy enough
to accumulate some interest-bearing financial asset. At least half family units are excluded from this
process instead. Indeed, the bottom-right panel in Figure 5 shows that the debt-to-income ratio of the
bottom 50 percent households increases when securitisation is introduced. The larger amount of financial
commitments low and middle class households will have to deal with eventually constitute the source of
the rise in financial income perceived by wealthy family units. Once again, we think this fact represents
a clear example of new and deeper sources of ‘exploitation rents’ that may actually develop thanks to the
pro-rich financial flows associated to securitisation and the proliferation of structured financial products.
5.3 Financial crises
In Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 we describe the structural relationship between some relevant financial
variables and inequality standards that develop in our simulated economy over a long-run time horizon.
In the present section we rather focus on the mechanisms behind the full-blown financial crisis that takes
place around period 800 of our simulation scenario with securitsation. Indeed, some of the results of our
theoretical analysis may be informative for a better understanding of the interaction between inequality
and finance in the generation of financial and economic shocks.
Figure 6 first shows the co-evolution of CBs’ leverage and non-performing loans. According to Figure
6, it seems that the former variable (CBs’ leverage) anticipates and drives the dynamics of the latter
(non performing loans). Other way around, CBs start to extend an increasing amount of credit to
the economy; a credit boom originates and CBs’ leverage increases, with obvious implications for the
(weaker) financial solidity of CBs themselves. Non-performing loans follow with some lags. Increasingly
indebted households and firms do not set all the expected interest payments, so that CBs’ revenues and
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Figure 6: NPL vs Bank Leverage. The red dashed line represents banks leverage (right axis), the dotted black line
represents the unpaid over due interests related to non-performing loans (left axis).
financial position deteriorate. CBs react to this event by adopting a stricter stance in the provision of new
loans. Actually, access to credit becomes restricted to a much smaller number of solid and creditworthy
households and firms. Credit rationing and the burst of the credit boom take place, with the ensuing
reduction in the amount of non-performing loans.
Whilst the end of credit euphoria and CBs’ deleveraging help CBs to restore some sort of financial
soundness, the consequences for the dynamics of the real economy may be harsh. This is what emerges
from Figure 6, which portrays the negative correlation between non-performing loans and the GDP growth
rate. Figure 6 actually shows that soaring non-performing loans, here identified as delayed consequences
of credit booms, are associated with reductions in economic activity and, eventually, economic slumps.
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Figure 7: NPL vs GDP growth. The red dashed line represents the rate of growth of GDP (right axis), the dotted black
line represents the unpaid over due interests related to non-performing loans (left axis).
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It is worth noting that the negative correlation between non-performing loans and GDP growth (or,
alternatively, the negative effect of a credit crunch over economic activity) is not a peculiar feature of
the specific ‘crisis event’ we are currently describing. It actually emerges as a well-established statistical
property of the full simulation over the entire time span we take into account. This fact is portrayed
in Figure 7 below which shows that, on top of the statistically significant negative correlation between
current values on non-performing loans and GDP growth, such a negative correlations gets even more
negative for lagged values of non-performing loans up to 7 lags. In our model, whenever a credit boom
initially gives rise to mounting financial fragility and to a rise in non-performing loans, it will soon or
later trigger off a showdown in economic activity if not a full-fledged economic crisis.
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Figure 8: NPL and GDP growth cross correlation. Red bars represent the correlation between lagged values of non-
performing loans and current GDP growth, blue horizontal lines define confidence intervals.
The correlation between credit booms, increasing non-performing loans and, eventually, economic
downturns, bring us back to the economic debate set out at the beginning of this work about to the
most relevant factors behind crises. The story we describe in this last section is certainly consistent
with the narrative put forward by Shularick and Taylor (2012) and Bordo and Meissner (2012), who
identify credit booms as the most prominent causes and predictors of financial and economic crises. This
fact notwithstanding, Shularick and Taylor (2012) and Bordo and Meissner (2012) neglect to analyse
in details which are the economic and/or institutional factors, which enable financial institutions to
frequently ignite and feed a credit boom. Shularick and Taylor (2012) and Bordo and Meissner (2012)
rightly mention financial liberalisation and financial innovations as potential triggers of boom-and-bust
cycles. But financial innovations are presented as exogenous events. In this model, we offer an alternative
and perhaps more general view, in which financial innovations that can give rise to unstable dynamics are
actually endogenous and tightly connected with the structural long-run forces governing the evolution of
the economic system.
The ‘credit-boom-gone bust’ we describe in this section (with its connections with non-performing
loans and economic growth) has been permitted by financial innovations such as the securitisation of
existing loans and the production of structured financial products. At the very least, credit booms and
unstable dynamics would have been far less acute in an economic system without securitisation. These
financial innovations are in turn intrinsically connected with unfolding structural trends in the economy,
namely rising income and wealth inequality. On the one hand, the production of CDOs is meant to
provide IFs and, indirectly, wealthy households with those remunerative assets satisfying their appetite
for high returns. On the other hand, the securitisation of existing loans, with the implicit transfer of
debtors’ interest payments from originating banks to rentiers, guarantees the supply of primary inputs
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for the production of CDOs themselves. This arm-length chain from inequality to economic dynamics
passing by securitization and CDOs is once again synthetically demonstrated in Figure 9 below.
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Figure 9: NPL vs Return on share. The red dashed line represents the return on shares (right axis), the dotted black line
represents the unpaid over due interests related to non-performing loans (left axis).
Figure 9 shows the negative correlation that clearly emerges between non-performing loans and the
remunerativeness of IFs’ shares at the time of the financial crisis in our simulation. A low level of
non-performing loans ensures that indebted households and firms generally comply with their payment
obligations, yields on CDOs are high as is the remunerativeness of IFs shares. But when the start of the
credit boom eventually leads to an increase in the number of non-performing loans, the remunerativeness
of CDOs and IFs shares decline. When the much lower remunerativeness of CDOs leads to a dry-up in the
market for CDOs (see upper-left panel in Figure 2), the securitisation process enabling the credit boom
comes to an end, and the boom inevitably goes bust. We already described the negative consequences
this sequence of events may produce on real-side economic dynamics. What is relevant for the purpose of
our analysis is that financial and economic crises emerge as the last outcome of the endogenous interplay
between between financial innovations, financial dynamics, and economic inequality. In our simulated
economy, income inequality is all but neutral with respect to economic shocks.
5.4 Two experiments on taxation and wage inequality
As described in Section 1, our work focuses on a very specific and often overlooked determinant of inequal-
ity. Other economic and political aspects not portrayed in our model are equally or even more important
in determining the level of inequality. In this section we describe the results of two computational ex-
periments which involve the degree of tax progressiveness and wage inequality. In both cases, we refer
to the model with securitization. In the first one we want to assess the role of taxation by comparing
the baseline model, in which two different tax rates are applied, with a scenario characterized by the
introduction of a single tax rate for all households (Flat Tax ). In particular, the level of the new tax rate
(0.252) is set so as to keep the fiscal balance almost unchanged, in order not to hamper the comparability
of the descriptive statistics. The second experiment (Wage Inequality) regards a more unequal wage
distribution. In particular, the second moment of the log-normal distribution of wages passes from 0.5
to 0.55. We perform two additional batteries of Monte Carlo simulations by running 100 simulations for
each new scenario. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.
Let’s first focus on the Flat Tax scenario. Table 3 shows three main results. First, the new fiscal
regime has a negative impact on growth. While the level of public debt over GDP is, by construction,
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close to (2% lower) what obtained in the Securitization scenario, private indebtedness is considerably
(7%) higher. Second, inequality, as measured by the two Gini indexes, increased and the rise is more
acute in the case of wealth. Private debt, measured both with respect to GDP and net income, increases
significantly. Other results are very much in line with previous scenario: in particular, albeit higher
private indebtedness, financial fragility and the probability the probability of crisis does not increase.
This results might very well be explained by credit rationing: while the median across Monte Carlo
simulations is 0.1297 with progressive taxation, the same value with the flat tax increases to 0.1519.
The different taxation regime impacts on disposable income, which in turn concurs in determining, via
debt service ratio, the access to credit. In this case the flat tax results in a lower access to credit for
the poorer households and eases access to credit for higher income households. The ease in access to
credit may be particularly relevant for those households whose wage is slightly above the threshold for a
higher tax rate, which can therefore purchase more shares, resulting in higher shares of securitized loans.
On the contrary, lower income households, which in the previous scenario are those defaulting on their
debt, having lower access to credit, are hampered in their possibility of relying on bank loans to purchase
assets. This results in higher wealth inequality and less GDP growth, without increasing the probability
of crises.
The second scenario, Wage Inequality, is aimed at portraying the outcomes of a more unequal wage
distribution combined with a financial system where securitization takes place (see again Table 3). The
reasons for the increased wage inequality may be various, as a weakening of trade unions or new labor
laws, and are not modelled in our paper. This scenario presents a level of GDP lower than Securitization
and comparable to the Flat Tax. Public debt is in this case significantly lower and this comes at the
expenses of private debt, which increases. Inequality is higher, markedly on income. The main results of
this scenario however pertains to financial fragility. Non performing loans are significantly higher and,
more interestingly, the probability of crisis escalates to become six time greater than in the Securitization
scenario, which means almost thirty times higher than in the baseline scenario.
The outcomes of the Flat Tax and Wage Inequality scenarios are even more interesting, if observed
jointly. In the former, wealth inequality rises but, due to stricter credit rationing, financial fragility is
considerably lower. This suggests that the positive nexus found by Levine (2005) (see Section 2) may
indeed take place, but at the sacrifice of increased financial fragility. That is to say, once obtained
credit, poor households may very well use the inflow of money to buy goods or assets. However, unless
purchased assets are income-generating - hence allowing for the debt to be repaid - the benefice will
only be transitionary and the positive effect on wealth inequality illusional. The debt burden will soon
become unsustainable and indebted poor households will default. This situation, if generalised, is bound
to determine a full-fledged financial crisis. In sum, easier access to credit, detached from a proper
redistribution of income, may very well be a self-defeating and destabilizing policy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse the interaction between finance and inequality. Most of the existing literature
on this topic tries to assess how the former may affect the latter or vice versa. Nevertheless, it does not
offer a comprehensive overview in which inequality standards and the development of modern financial
systems co-evolve, feed back one into the other, and jointly shape the short- and long-run dynamics of
an economy. With this work, we aim at filling this gap. For this purpose, we present a hybrid AB-SFC
model featuring an economy composed by one thousand heterogeneous household units. We run a battery
of Montecarlo simulations over a time horizons of one thousand periods through which we can infer how
finance and inequality evolve and concur to determine the emerging structural properties of our simulated
economy. Three points are worth noting as to the results of our simulations.
First, in a world allowing for the securitisation of Commercial Banks’ loans, income and wealth
inequality constitutes the in-depth sources for the demand of remunerative structured financial products
(by wealthy households) and the ensuing securitisation of existing liabilities (of indebted middle and low
class households). These modern financial practices in turn exacerbate income and wealth inequality
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Securitization Flat Tax Wage Inequality
GDP growth
- mean 0.0249 0.0248 0.0248
- Standard Deviation 0.0155 0.0158 0.0157
- Skewness -0.0594 -0.0584 -0.0576
- Kurtosis 2.0470 2.0718 2.0690
GDP level∗ 1 0.8766 0.8816
GDP shares
- Consumption 0.5464 0.5463 0.5463
- Public Purchases 0.1257 0.1260 0.1260
- Investment 0.3278 0.3278 0.3278
Public Debt 1.8076 1.7804 1.4483
Gini Indexes
- Income 0.2912 0.2937 0.3172
- Wealth 0.7373 0.7658 0.7521
Loan Stock over GDP 1.7565 1.8240 1.8061
Debt to income ratio 0.9950 1.0919 1.0212
Non-Performing Loans
- Mean 0.0112 0.0096 0.0177
- Standard Deviation 0.0020 0.0017 0.0034
- Skewness 0.6090 0.6826 1.0557
- Kurtosis 2.8785 3.1018 4.4488
- Crisis Probability∗ 0.0530 0.0520 0.3230
Share of securitized loans 0.2855 0.3109 0.2964
∗ GDP last period ‘Securitization’ = 1
∗∗ Unpaid interest related to NPL above 5% of all interests
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics comparing the ‘Securitization’ scenario with the ‘Flat Tax’ scenario and
the ‘Wage Inequality’ scenario.
with respect to a more traditional ‘originate-and-hold’ financial system without securitisation.
Second, the perverse interaction between rising inequality and and over-expanding financial system
increases the probability of financial and economic crises. In our model, we verify that the concentration
of wealth and income in the hands of a few rises the demand for remunerative financial assets (Investment
Funds’ shares and Collateralised Debt Obligations), which then spurs the securitisation of existing assets
and allows CBs’ to extend more loans to the economy. Whilst GDP growth may temporarily benefit
from this, credit booms more likely unfold and eventually bust, giving rise to recessions. The absence
of an asset which may loose value, the aggregate CBs, SPVs, and IFs sectors, with the consequent lack
of financial units defaulting, make the model resilient to crisis. Feature developments of the model will
relax this characteristics in order to better assess the impact of extend crisis and the role of financial
speculation.
Third, we run two different computational experiments in order to see the effects of the introduction
of a flat tax regime and of a more unequal distribution of wages on the performance of our simulated
economy. In both cases, we find that income and wealth inequality increases. More importantly, we find
that in both the experiments average GDP growth declines, its volatility increases, and the probability of
crisis rises, in the second experiment (higher wage inequality) more than in the former (flat tax). Easier
access to credit, detached from a proper redistribution of income, appears to be a self-defeating and
destabilizing policy.
All in all, the results of our simulations tend to reject the promises of ‘trickle-down economics’.
Unregulated (modern) finance, a better taxation for the rich, and/or a more throat-cut system (read
higher wage inequality) do not improve economic dynamics, make economic systems more unstable and
crisis-prone, and exacerbate the unequal distribution of resources.
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Households Banks SPV IF Firms Gov Total
Deposits +DH −D +DSPV +DIF +DF 0
Capital +K +K
Shares +Sh −Sh 0
Bonds +BB +BIF −B 0
Loans −LH +(1 − z)L +zL −LF 0
Derivatives −CDO +CDO 0
Table 4: Aggregate Balance Sheet (Initial Situation)
Households Banks SPV IF Firms Govt. Σ
CA KA CA KA CA KA CA KA
Consumption −C 0 0 0 0 0 0 +C 0 0 0
Publ. Exp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +G 0 −G 0
Investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +I −I 0 0
Wages +W 0 0 0 0 0 0 −W 0 0
Taxes −TH 0 0 0 0 0 0 −TF 0 +T 0
Int. on Loans −rhLht − 1 +r(1 − z)L 0 +rzL 0 0 0 −rfLft−1 0 0 0
Return on Deriv. 0 0 0 −fCDO 0 +fCDO 0 0 0 0 0
Return on Shares +RSH 0 0 0 −RSH 0 0 0 0 0
Int. on Bonds 0 +RBB 0 0 0 +RBIF 0 0 0 −RB 0
Dividends 0 −DivB 0 0 0 +DivB 0 0 0 0 0
Profits +ΠH 0 0 0 0 −ΠIF +ΠIF −ΠF +ΠF 0 0
Change in the stocks of
Deposits −∆DH 0 +∆D 0 0 0 −∆DIF 0 −∆DF 0 0
Loans +∆LH 0 −∆(1 − z)L 0 −∆zL 0 0 0 +∆LF 0 0
Derivatives 0 0 0 0 +∆CDO 0 −∆CDO 0 0 0 0
Shares −∆Sh 0 0 0 0 0 +∆Sh 0 0 0 0
Bonds 0 −∆BB 0 0 0 −∆BIF 0 0 +∆B 0
∆ Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 5: Aggregate Transaction Flow Matrix (Initial Situation)
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